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ABSTRACT
This article examines the potential impact of the
populist challenge to international law on the United
Nations Security Council. The Security Council is
often criticized as ineffective, unprincipled, and an
anachronistic mechanism that reflects a power
balance from the past, rather than the realities of
today. The article argues that the rise of populism is
likely to further erode the Security Council’s
legitimacy and efficacy. At the same time, however, it
emphasizes the need for greater nuance in the way
that both the phenomenon of populism, as well as the
relationship between national and international
concerns, are understood and framed. Taking these
complexities into account, the Article explores three
scenarios that could result from an escalating crisis of
Security Council legitimacy. The first involves reform
and renewal. The second comprises retreat and
realignment. The third encompasses reimagining the
international peace and security architecture and
creating something new.
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INTRODUCTION
The UN Charter bestows upon the United Nations Security
Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security.1 Yet the Council is often criticized as ineffective,
unprincipled, or an anachronistic mechanism that reflects a power
balance from the past, rather than the realities of today.2 Criticism of
the Security Council’s composition and the permanent member veto
power originated before the Council even existed, as delegates at the
1945 San Francisco Conference debated the merits of establishing a
body that would elevate five member states above the rest, thus
opening the door to a system of might makes right.3 Ultimately, the
UN Charter endowed the five permanent members with the ability to
place their national interests above the collective international interest
by vetoing prospective Council action to maintain or restore
international peace and security.4
This article examines the potential impact of the populist
challenge to International Law on the United Nations Security
Council. It argues that the rise of populism is likely to further erode
the Security Council’s legitimacy and efficacy. At the same time,
however, the populist challenge might also create opportunities for
constructive change by opening up new avenues to reinforce,
recalibrate, or revamp the norms and institutions that the twenty-first
century requires to maintain global peace and security. For this to
occur, there is a need for greater nuance in the way that both the
phenomenon of populism, as well as the relationship between
national and international concerns, are understood and framed.
Taking these complexities into account, the Article explores three
different scenarios that could result from an escalating crisis of
Security Council legitimacy.
The article proceeds in three sections. Section I recalls the
composition and powers of the Security Council for the maintenance
of international peace and security. Section II discusses the
1. U.N. Charter art. 24, ¶ 1.
2. See, e.g., RAMESH THAKUR, THE UNITED NATIONS, PEACE AND SECURITY 339-42 (2d
ed. 2017).
3. Some states were against the very idea, with Mexico and the Netherlands arguing
that the UN system would be fundamentally flawed and unjust if one country were able to
prevent the Security Council from taking urgent action to maintain the peace. See
Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, Volume XI,
Commission III, Security Council at 163-4 (Netherlands) and 333 (Mexico). U.N. Docs.
1150/III/12 (June 22, 1945) and 459/III/1/22 (May 21, 1945).
4. U.N. Charter art. 27.
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phenomenon of populism and its potential impact on the UN Security
Council. Section III then examines three different scenarios that
could result from a populist-driven crisis of Security Council
legitimacy. The first scenario involves reinforcing the Security
Council as the primary body responsible for the maintenance of
international peace and security, through reform and renewal. The
second scenario would see UN member states employing a retreat
and realign strategy, thus disengaging, whether formally or
informally, from the UN Charter framework and investing their
energy in existing or new peace and security coalitions at the regional
or bilateral level. The third scenario, reimagining and recreating,
would envisage the end of the UN peace and security system and the
creation of something completely new.
I.

THE COMPOSITION AND POWERS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL

At the San Francisco Conference on International Organization
in 1945, the founders of the United Nations were motivated by the
need to secure active participation of the most powerful states, thus
creating an international organization that ‘would not stand idly by in
the face of threats to international peace and security’.5 The UN
Charter created an international peace and security system with
unprecedented reach and ambition. While the system has never
fulfilled its prefatory aspirational objective of ridding the world of the
‘scourge of conflict’,6 it has proven remarkably resilient. Unlike its
predecessor, the League of Nations, which failed to attract all key
players into its membership, then lost existing key members when
international friction escalated through the 1930s, the UN system has
attracted and retained great and small powers alike, achieving
practically universal membership.7
The UN Charter created the Security Council as not just one of
the six principal UN organs, but as the organ tasked with taking
action to maintain international peace and security. Chapter V of the
Charter sets out the composition, functions and procedures of the
Council. Article 23 thus lists the five permanent members of the
United Nations, namely China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom
and the United States, and notes that the United Nations General
5. JEREMY M. FARRALL, UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS AND THE RULE OF LAW 58 (2007).
6. U.N. Charter preface.
7. On the League of Nations and its shortcomings, See PAUL KENNEDY, THE
PARLIAMENT OF MAN: THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF THE UNITED NATIONS 8-24
(2006).
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Assembly (“UNGA”) shall elect the ten remaining non-permanent
members that round out the Council’s current membership of fifteen.8
Article 24 bestows upon the Council primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security.9 Article 25 then
reinforces the power of the Security Council to take decisive and
meaningful action by specifying that the Council’s decisions are
binding on all UN member states.10 Chapter V is also significant for
the way in which it shapes the Security Council’s decision-making
dynamics by granting the permanent members under Article 27 the
power to veto any prospective substantive decision.11
The Council’s substantive powers are laid out in Chapters VI,
VII & VIII of the Charter. Chapter VI sets out the Council’s peaceful
settlement powers, including the ability to call on member states to
resolve their disputes peacefully through a range of dispute resolution
mechanisms such as negotiation, enquiry, mediation, arbitration,
conciliation and judicial settlement.12 Chapter VII provides that the
Council shall determine the existence of threats to the peace,
breaches of the peace and acts of aggression,13 and take action
accordingly to maintain or restore international peace and security,
including applying sanctions short of force,14 or authorizing the use of
force itself.15 Chapter VIII of the Charter encourages the Council to
make use of regional arrangements or agencies in meeting its
responsibilities and exercising its powers under Chapters VI and
VII.16
II.

HOW DOES THE POPULIST CHALLENGE IMPACT THE UN SECURITY
COUNCIL?

The other articles in this symposium document the nature and
scale of the populist challenge to international law. As Mark Graber
explains, populist movements are primarily motivated by a desire to
ensure that ordinary people can exercise some degree of agency over
the exercise of public decision-making power.17 Populists tend to be
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

U.N. Charter art. 23.
U.N. Charter art. 24, ¶ 1.
Id. art. 25.
Id. art. 27, ¶ 3.
Id. art. 33.
Id. art. 39.
Id. art. 41.
Id. art. 42.
Id. arts. 52-54.
See The Populist Challenge to the International Legal Order (Symposium),
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distrustful of the elites and experts who dominate public decisionmaking, viewing these elites as removed from ordinary people and
their everyday lives and thus unable to appreciate their needs,
interests and fears. Populists are thus deeply skeptical of official
institutions, including the legislature, executive and judiciary, which
they consider to represent and serve primarily the interests of the
ruling elite, rather than of the people in general. They support more
direct, more proximate public decision-making that reflects and
promotes their interests.
There is a tendency in the contemporary literature to equate
populism with a form of right wing politics that seeks to decrease the
scale and reach of the government and the public institutions that
support it. The logical extension of equating populism with this
politics is the assumption that populism axiomatically leads to
nationalism, meaning that all populists would prefer their countries to
retreat from international norms and institutions that place
international causes above national needs. However, as Graber
shows, the commitment of populism to increasing the democratic
representation of ordinary people, improving the transparency and
accountability of government, and ensuring that elite-decisionmaking is grounded in the experiences of everyday people in the real
world, does not necessarily lead to politics or activism that is
isolationist and/or nationalist. It can also lead to politics or activism
that is communitarian and/or internationalist.
A case-in-point is the debate that is currently raging in Australia,
where increasing temperatures throughout 2019 caused severe
drought, which left the Australian bush tinder-dry, leading to the
most widespread and destructive Australian bushfire season on
record. There is increasing frustration among ordinary people
throughout the South-Eastern sections of Australia ravaged by fires
and exposed to months of hazardous smoky air, that the nation’s
politicians, from both the left and the right, have failed to take
meaningful action to transform the Australian fossil-fuel-dependent
economy and decrease Australia’s carbon emissions to slow climate
change. In this context, the populist perspective despairs at the
inability of elite politicians of both left and right to take seriously the
threat of climate change and to place local and global existential
environmental needs above their traditional carbon-based-economydriven politics and policies. Thus Australia, at the beginning of 2020,
MARYLAND
CAREY
LAW
(Oct.
https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil_symposia/2019/.

17-18,

2019),
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might be witnessing the early stages of a populist-based movement
that could force elites to embrace carbon-neutral economic planning
that elevates environmental concerns above the interests of fossil-fuel
industries.
A. The purported binary antagonism between national and
international interests
The tendency to equate populism with nationalism is often
accompanied by the inclination to present national and international
interests as inherently antagonistic. This approach was dramatically
employed by US President Donald Trump in his address to the
United Nations General Assembly in New York in September 2019,
when he proclaimed:
The future does not belong to globalists. The future
belongs to patriots. The future belongs to sovereign
and independent nations who protect their citizens,
respect their neighbors, and honor the differences that
make each country special and unique.18
The assumption underpinning this statement is, to channel the
President’s typical vernacular, that nationalism is good, whereas
internationalism is ‘very, very bad’. This approach was echoed
weeks later by Australia’s Prime Minister, Scott Morrison, in a
speech to a prominent think-tank on international affairs:
The world works best when the character and
distinctiveness of independent nations is preserved
within a framework of mutual respect. This includes
respecting electoral mandates of their constituencies.
… We should avoid any reflex towards a negative
globalism that coercively seeks to impose a mandate
from an often ill defined borderless global community.
And worse still, an unaccountable internationalist
bureaucracy.19
Both of these statements are underpinned by a reduction of the
world into simplistic, binary stereotypes. So you are either a patriot
18. U.S. President Donald Trump, Remarks to the 74th Session of the UN General
Assembly (Sept. 24, 2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarkspresident-trump-74th-session-united-nations-general-assembly/.
19. Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison, In our Interest, Lecture at the Lowy
Institute (Oct. 4, 2019), http://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/2019-lowy-lecture-primeminister-scott-morrison.
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or you are a globalist. In this mindset, it is impossible to be both.
You either respect national sovereignty or you are part of an ‘ill
defined, borderless global community’. In this mindset, it is
inconceivable that you could believe in global community and still
respect national sovereignty.
The portrayal of the national and international interests as
inherently opposed ignores the origins and nature of international law
and institutions. For the creation of international law and institutions
has always been grounded in the belief that national sovereignty and
national consent are sacrosanct. Put another way, international law
was created to preserve the national interests of states. It is for this
reason that critical scholars decry the way that traditional
international law elevates the concerns of the state over the concerns
of individuals and that it protects and perpetuates a world-view that
prioritizes the needs and interests of powerful, largely western states,
such as the United States and Australia. Indeed, the primary reason
why the leaders of both states invested so heavily in the norms and
institutions of the United Nations and the post-World War II liberal
international order was to preserve and promote their core national
interests, including democracy, human rights and the rule of law. It
is thus both ironic and counter-productive for the leaders of the
United States and Australia to be framing international cooperation as
contrary to their national interest. Why has it suddenly become
impossible for patriots and globalists to share a commitment to
international law and institutions that promote both international
peace and security and national prosperity and stability? The next
section explores the impact of the populist challenge on the activities
of the UN Security Council.
B. How does the populist challenge impact the UN Security
Council?
As the introduction to this article notes, the Security Council is
frequently criticized for being ineffective or unprincipled or both. To
what extent does the populist challenge amplify or supplement these
criticisms? The previous section notes that populism is primarily
concerned with empowering the ordinary person to exercise agency
over the public decisions that affect them. One might therefore
expect populists to be deeply skeptical of an international institution
like the UN Security Council, which is effectively an elitist and
undemocratic entity within an elitist, unrepresentative organization of
states.
In order to anticipate the likely populist critique of the UN
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Security Council, it is useful to begin with the likely populist critique
of the United Nations more generally. Of course, the question of
what constitutes the UN can invite many different answers.20 Does
the term refer primarily to the collection of 193 UN member states?
Does it refer to the key decision-making bodies in which those
member states participate, such as the UN General Assembly? Does
it refer to the UN Secretariat and its international civil service, which
supports the decisions and policy agendas of those decision-making
bodies? Does it refer to the dozens of UN programs, agencies and
subsidiary organs created by UN member states and/or those bodies?
Or is it some combination of the above?
The specific implications of the populist critique will likely
differ depending on which of these incarnations of the UN the
observer has in mind. For present purposes, a useful starting point is
the UN General Assembly, as it purports to represent the nations of
the world. What might populists make of the UNGA? One
interpretation of the UNGA is that as there are 193 UN member
states, the UNGA provides a forum in which the views of all of the
peoples of the world, including the ordinary people within all of the
peoples of the world, can be aired, shared and taken into account.
But the problem with this rosy take on the diversity of views on show
in the UNGA is that the representatives of these countries are often
even more removed from the ordinary people within their countries
than their governments and public institutions are. This is because
they sit in New York as the representatives of those governments.
Thus, rather than bringing decision-making closer to the ordinary
person, the UNGA arguably extends the distance between decisionmaking body and ordinary people, in both a figurative and a literal
sense. Populists are thus likely to be suspicious of the UNGA,
viewing it as even more elitist than their own governments.
Turning to the Security Council, then, one might expect
populists to be even more critical, as the Council adds another layer
of elitist decision-making over and above the already unconscionably
elitist layer of the UNGA. This is because the Council contains a
small proportion of the 193 member states, with just fifteen Council
members. Moreover, the division of Council members into two
categories, namely permanent and non-permanent, further
exacerbates both the Council’s elitism and its level of removal from
ordinary people.
20. Kennedy, supra note 7, at xvi (stating that “there are in practice many United
Nations”).
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At face value, one could therefore expect the populist challenge
to heighten calls for the Security Council to become more democratic
and more accountable to ordinary people in the ordinary countries
throughout the world. Yet this is where tensions arise between the
populist ‘push’ against elitism and its variants that ‘pull’ towards
nationalism. For those populists whose country is a permanent
member, such as those who are United States citizens, that permanent
membership guarantees that the national interest, at least as it is
interpreted and framed by the incumbent US administration, will be
promoted and preserved on and through the UN Security Council.
Thus, while populists might prefer that ordinary people exercised
greater agency over their country’s representation on the Council,
they may nevertheless derive reassurance from the fact that the veto
power guarantees that the Security Council will not take a decision
that undermines the core national interests of their country.
It is worth recalling that the founders of the United Nations,
including in particular the prospective permanent members, designed
the Security Council as a body that would preserve the core national
interests of the permanent members. Thus the agency of those
countries in Council decision-making was guaranteed. For this
reason, the relationship of populism with the Security Council is
more nuanced. On the one hand, the populist aversion to elite
decision-making invites a negative reaction to the Council, which is
an elitist institution par excellence. But on the other, the preservation
of the great powers’ national interests, in the form of the veto power,
suggests that at least those populists from countries that possess
permanent membership might be less antagonistic towards the
Council due to the manner in which the Council preserves their
countries’ national interests. The corollary of this, however, is that
populists from non-permanent member states are likely to be more
skeptical and critical of the Council than those from permanent
member states.
III. THREE FUTURE RESPONSE SCENARIOS
The following three sections each explore a different scenario in
terms of the potential impact of the populist challenge for
international law and institutions.21 The first scenario involves
21

For an exploration of how these scenarios might unfold in relation to the
backlash against global law and institutions pertaining to the environment, human
rights, international peace and security, and trade and finance, see Peter G.
Danchin, Jeremy Farrall, Jolyon Ford, Shruti Rana, Imogen Saunders and Daan
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reform and renewal. The second involves retreat and realignment.
The third involves reimagining and recreating.
A.

Reform and Renewal

The first scenario would involve reform and renewal of the
Security Council, in order to make it less elitist and more proximate
to the ordinary person. There is, of course, a long tradition of efforts
to reform the structure of the Security Council. As noted above,
when the United Nations was created, the total number of
foundational UN member states was fifty-one and the Security
Council initially had eleven members, with the five permanent
members and six non-permanent members serving two-year terms.
This meant that more than twenty percent of UN members were
Security Council members. By 1965, when the number of Council
members was expanded to fifteen, there were one hundred and
thirteen UN members. This meant that more than twelve percent of
UN members were Council members. Today there are 193 UN
member states.
Proposals to reform the Security Council have been on the
UNGA agenda since 1979. In recent decades these efforts have
tended to focus on expanding membership to provide greater
geographic representation of the full UN membership. Perhaps the
most sophisticated Security Council reform proposal was advanced
by then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, in his report entitled ‘In
Larger Freedom’, which endorsed a number of recommendations by
the 2004 High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. The
proposal was that the Council should be expanded to 24 members,
with more equitable regional distribution so that 6 seats would be
allocated to each of Africa, Asia/Pacific, Europe and the Americas.
Beyond these basic parameters, the Secretary-General requested
UN member states to choose between two models. According to the
first model (‘Model A’), there would be six new permanent seats
without veto and three new two-year seats, divided among the major
regions. According to the second model (‘Model B’), there would be
eight four-year renewable seats and one new two-year, nonrenewable seat. Ultimately neither option was endorsed by the 2005
World Summit. As Langmore and Thakur have noted, the fact that
the Secretary-General advanced two models rather than one, as well
as that neither secured the necessary support to be adopted at the
Verhoeven, Navigating the Backlash against Global Law and Institutions, 38
AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2020).

FARRALL(DO NOT DELETE)

2/21/21 12:46 PM

2020] THE POPULIST CHALLENGE AND FUTURE OF UN SEC. COUNCIL

83

World Summit, indicate that while most UN members can agree in
the abstract that reform should take place, they are not inclined to
agree when it becomes clear precisely how concrete proposals will
not benefit them.22
Since the World Summit in 2005 a variety of state groupings
have pushed different and often conflicting structural reform agendas.
The Group of Four (G4) contains major powers and prospective
permanent members Germany, India, Brazil and Japan. Its preferred
model is expanding the Council to 25 members, with the additional
ten slots including six new permanent members, namely the G4
themselves and two additional African states, as well as four new
elected seats.
The African Group contains all fifty-four African Union
member states. Its preferred model would expand the Council to
twenty-six members, including the addition of seven African seats,
two of which would be permanent.
The Uniting for Consensus Group was created by countries who
are united largely by their opposition to the agenda of the G4. Its
membership includes Argentina, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Italy, Malta, Mexico, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, San Marino, Spain
and Turkey. The preferred UFCG model would expand the Council
to twenty-five members, with ten new rotating non-permanent seats.
The L69 Group comprises more than forty developing states,
who sponsored a draft resolution on Security Council reform entitled
‘L69’.23 The L69’s preferred model would expand the Council to
twenty-seven members, with the twelve new seats divided
geographically as follows: four seats (two permanent and two nonpermanent) to Africa; three seats to Asia (two permanent and one
non-permanent); two seats to the Latin America (one permanent and
one non-permanent); one additional permanent Western Europe and
Other seat; one non-permanent seat to Small Island Developing
States; and one additional Eastern European non-permanent seat.
This short summary of these various reform groupings and
proposals neatly illustrates the considerable challenge of getting UN
member states to agree on a game-plan to move forward with
meaningful reform and renewal of the Security Council. Moreover,
22. John Langmore & Ramesh Thakur, The Elected but Neglected Security Council
Members, 39 THE WASH. Q. 99, 103 (2016).
23. Agenda Item 111 for the Sixty-First Session of the U.N. General Assembly, U.N.
Security Council Reform Process, U.N. Doc. A/61/L69 (Sept. 11, 2007).
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even if a single model were to achieve widespread support from the
general membership, any formal proposal to reform the Council
would require a formal amendment to the UN Charter. This means
that it would be subject to the veto of the permanent members, in any
event. This decreases the prospects of success for any formal reform
and renew process. Recognizing this, a number of largely smaller
states have joined together in a grouping called Accountability,
Coherence and Transparency’ (ACT), which seeks to promote
procedural modifications that improve the Council’s accountability to
the general UN membership. This push for greater accountability
and transparency might resonate with populist concerns, even though
it is driven by the same types of expert diplomatic representatives
who have been identified above as increasing the distance between
ordinary people and decision-makers.
B.

Retreat and Realignment

The second scenario would involve states responding to populist
dissatisfaction with the UN Security Council by disengaging from the
Security Council and the UN Charter collective security framework it
serves. According to this scenario, states might retreat and realign
with like-minded and/or regional neighbor states to cooperate, or at
least reach a mutual understanding about the parameters of, more
proximate frameworks of principles to manage the risk of future
violent conflict within and between such states. There are a number
of examples of regional or sub-regional security arrangements,
including the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe,
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the Association of SouthEast Asian Nations Regional Forum. These arrangements are
traditionally viewed as falling within and complementing the UN
Charter framework for security.
But it is likely that these
arrangements would form the first port of call for states who become
disenchanted with the Security Council.
It is unclear to what extent these existing security arrangements
could combine to create both reliable and sustainable alliances and
networks to maintain global peace and security. Moreover, if
existing arrangements prove incapable of promoting and protecting
international security, what additional regulatory measures would be
necessary to deter behavior by states and non-state actors that
threatens the territorial integrity and political independence of other
states? With the retreat from the UN collective security system,
would states revert to pre-United Nations principles of classic
international law? Or would they need to develop new principles?
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What types of new rules and institutions might emerge in this new
balance of powers era?
It is also interesting to speculate as to how populists of different
stripes and nationalities might respond to this second scenario. To
what extent would populist enthusiasm for disengagement from the
UN Security Council and the collective security framework align
with the relative benefits that their country gains from the status quo?
It is conceivable that populists in states with little opportunity to
participate on, or exercise influence over, the Security Council might
see retreat as an attractive option, as they have never sat on the
Council and have thus had little input into its decision-making and
strategic policy directions.
By contrast, populists from permanent members, or even nonpermanent members who frequently sit on the Council, might be
more reluctant to embrace the retreat option if the consequence is to
diminish rather than enhance the influence of their state over global
affairs. Here it is interesting to contrast, for example, the position of
the United States in relation to the central global peace and security
institution, the Security Council, with its position on the central
human rights institution, the Human Rights Council, or indeed the
central global trade institution, the World Trade Organization and its
appellate body. Presumably most populists would have supported the
Trump administration’s walkout from the HRC and its steps to shut
down the World Trade Organization’s Appellate Body, whereas they
would be less enthusiastic if Trump were to propose abandoning the
Security Council.
A final point is that it is perfectly conceivable that states might
engage in both of the strategies implied in the two first scenarios at
the same time. Thus, to channel a wise Muslim saying, a state might
trust in Allah (i.e. supporting and engaging in UN reform proposals),
while nevertheless tying up its camel (i.e. creating complementary
regional alliances and networks, which could take on greater
significance if/when the Security Council’s days become numbered).
C.

Reimagine and Recreate

The third scenario is both the most fascinating and the most
challenging to flesh out. If the global community were to start from
scratch with the mission of creating a new, fit-for-purpose framework
of norms and institutions for maintaining global peace and security,
what would they look like? Who would sit at the most important
decision-making tables, for how long, and with what powers? How
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would their legitimacy be reinforced and regenerated? What
structures, mechanisms, norms and resources would be required to
guarantee the responsiveness, credibility and resourcefulness of the
new system?
It is beyond the scope of this brief article to speculate in any
meaningful way on the likely substance of the new norms and
institutions that would have to be developed to maintain global peace
and security throughout and beyond the twenty-first century. But it is
possible to contemplate the type of process that might be required to
deliver such norms and institutions. As a starting-point, in order to
create a new framework that resonates with and attracts the loyalty
and commitment of people around the world, the process would need
to reach beyond the traditional international law and United Nations
paradigm that views states as the primary actor of international law
and international relations. While the Charter begins with the phrase
‘We, the peoples of the United Nations’, thus creating the impression
that the United Nations exists for all people, the United Nations
system is founded on the understanding that states, rather than
people, are the primary decision-making actors. Only ‘peace-loving’
states can be members of the United Nations and the benefits and
obligations of UN membership accrue to states as members. The
Charter further elevates the status of states as the primary actor by
recognizing the principles of sovereign equality and of noninterference in the domestic affairs of other states.24
As a product of the mid-twentieth century, it was to be expected
that the UN Charter would recognize the role of states as the primary
subjects of international law and thus as the foundational members of
the new United Nations organization. But international law and
international relations have moved on substantially in the seventyfive years since the San Francisco Conference. The obligations of
states under international law now extend beyond those owed to other
states to include those owed to individuals and groups of individuals,
both within and beyond their own state jurisdictions. Moreover,
despite the fact that international law-making processes continue to
prioritize the primary role and prerogatives of states, other actors are
exerting increasing influence over the formation, modification,
monitoring and enforcement of international norms. These actors
include non-governmental organizations and private sector
corporations. It is thus not such a radical thought to imagine a new
model of international organization that empowers actors other than
24. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4, 7.
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states to contribute to the decision-making processes that shape the
new norms and institutions that are necessary to maintenance of
international peace and security in and beyond the twenty-first
century. The new world organization would thus need to be not just
for ‘the peoples of the United Nations’, but for all people.
What process would be required to determine who the members
of the new world organization should be? A helpful starting-point
would be the lessons derived from previous efforts by the UN itself to
facilitate constitution-making at the national level. For a serious
process of reimagining and recreating a global system of norms and
institutions that are fit-for-purpose in the twenty-first century would
effectively represent, just as the San Francisco Conference did, an
effort to develop a new constitution for the international community.
The UN Guidance for Effective Mediation identifies a set of
seven mediation fundamentals, which combine to deliver an effective
(mediated) peacemaking process.25 Of particular importance to the
development of an effective consultative process is the fundamental
of inclusivity. In a peacemaking context, the concept of inclusivity
refers to the need to consider not just the views of the parties to the
recently concluded conflict, who are typically the former government
and any opposition or rebel groups, but critically also to take into
account the perspectives of other stakeholders in the post-conflict
society.26 These stakeholders might be women’s groups, religious
communities, civil society organizations, or private sector
corporations.
While it would be demanding the impossible to expect a peace
process to account for the views of all individuals from that society in
formal peace negotiations, it is possible to create consultative
mechanisms in such a way that they draw the widest possible
diversity of perspectives into the process. The UN Guidance
suggests a number of strategies to promote inclusivity, including
developing mechanisms to broaden participation and engage different
perspectives throughout the various phases of a peacemaking process,
as well as using social media and opinion polls, to inform and engage
a wide range of participants.27 Adapting these lessons to the context
of global constitution-making, it should be possible in an increasingly
25. Report of the U.N. Secretary General, Strengthening the Role of Mediation in the
Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, Conflict Prevention and Resolution, Annex I, ¶ 16-52, U.N.
Doc. A/66/811 (June 25, 2012).
26. Id. at ¶ 29.
27. Id. at ¶ 34.
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interconnected world to devise a consultative process that provides an
opportunity for not just ‘all the Peoples of the United Nations’, but all
people in the world to feel included in the new process and therefore
to hold a sense of ownership over and commitment to the new rules
and institutions that emerge from the global constitution-making
process.
CONCLUSION
As the articles in this Symposium attest, the populist challenge
threatens to unpick global institutions and norms across a range of
fields, including human rights, trade and the environment. In the
field of international peace and security, however, the global
architecture seems less precarious. The most obvious explanation for
this is that the architecture itself was built on the premise that the
most powerful states would place national interest above the
international interest as a matter of course. This meant that the
system was structured in such a way as to fuse the international
interest with the national interests of the most powerful states. So
what we have in the United Nations Security Council is an institution
that already delivers a type of populist vision. The big question is at
what point the mid-twentieth century pragmatic internationalist
populist vision, which deftly intertwined the nationalist and
internationalist impulses in service of a global community, will
become so out of sync with the contemporary populist and
international visions, that it becomes vulnerable to decay,
disengagement or destruction.
The challenge in the field of international peace and security
continues to be how to maintain the commitment of the world’s key
constituent parts to engaging with the rest of the world in a way that
eschews violence and promotes friendly relations. The UN Charter
system, for all its flaws and failures, has somehow managed to
deliver a remarkably stable period in international relations, ensuring
that the great powers of its age have not resorted to full-scale global
warfare to achieve their objectives. This is no small feat.
This article echoes calls elsewhere in this symposium for the
introduction of increased nuance in how the concept of populism and
the challenges it poses for international law are understood. It also
argues that the relationship between the national interest and
international concerns is more symbiotic than antagonistic. For these
reasons, the impact on the UN Security Council of the populist
challenge to international law is less easy to identify or predict than
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one might expect. The article has explored three potential scenarios
for how states and other actors might respond to the populist
challenge. Time will tell whether one, or more, or none of these
scenarios come to pass. But whatever the consequences of the
populist challenge might be, this author is convinced, like the UN
founders once were, that the future will belong to both patriots and
globalists.

